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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WANDA MARIE SACKETT BAGSHAW, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 880647-CA 
vs. : 
Priority Classification 
JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW : No. 14b 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Jurisdiction 
The Jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under Utah Constitution, 
Article VIII, § 5; and § 78-2A-3(2)(h) of the Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) as amended. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a Judgment for unpaid alimony arrearages 
in favor of Respondent Wanda Marie Sackett Bagshaw entered on 
said Respondent's Order to Show Cause against Appellant Joseph 
Arthur Bagshaw on September 20, 1988 by the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, Judge, Third District Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Does Appellantfs assertion of the facts in this matter, 
even in the most favorable light to Appellant, give the Court 
below good cause to enter a Nunc Pro Tunc Order modifying the 
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Decree of Divorce in this matter pursuant to the statutory provisions 
of § 30-4a-l of the Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, and 
as interpreted by this Court in Home v. Home, 737 P. 2d 244 
(Utah App. 1987)? 
2. Was the Court below correct in its application of the 
legal precedence set forth in Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah 
App. 1987) to the facts in this matter? 
3. Should the Court award costs and attorney's fees to 
Respondent incurred in the response to this appeal? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutes relevant to the determination of this case 
include § 25-5-4 and § 30-4a-l, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. This is an action that was commenced 
by Respondent to recover alimony arrearages that were due and 
owing pursuant to a divorce decree entered in this matter on 
January 10, 1973. 
2. Course of Proceedings. Upon Respondent's order to show 
cause, The Court below awarded $19,400 to Respondent in September 
1988, ruling inter alia that there was no reason to terminate 
alimony by reasons of the actions of Respondent and that the 
alimony awarded to Respondent remained in full force and effect 
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from the time of its entry to the present, and has not been 
terminated by the Appellant by prior order of the Court. Appellant 
consequently brought this appeal. 
3. Disposition at Trial Court. After finding that Respondent 
had done nothing that would justify termination of alimony pursuant 
to the decree; that there was no enforceable agreement between 
the parties modifying the Decree to eliminate alimony; and there 
being no finding of the Court for good cause to make a nunc pro 
tunc order to modify such decree, Respondent was awarded judgment 
in the amount of $19,400. Each party was ordered to pay their 
own costs and attorney's fees. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
The parties to this action were married June 7, 1958 and 
had 2 children born of issue to the marriage (Record, Page 129). 
The Appellant had what he described as a 9th grade education 
(Id.) and during the course of his relationship with the Respondent 
before and during the marriage, he corresponded with her by 
letter while in the military, he maintained a subscription to 
Outdoor Life, he read proclamations, and he signed papers when 
items were purchased (Wanda Bagshaw Testimony, Page 21 - Addendum 
Exhibit "B"). 
On April 7, 1972 Respondent filed a Divorce Complaint (Record, 
Page 2), and on December 3, 1972, Appellant made his entry of 
appearance and waived his time to plead or otherwise answer, 
signing such appearance and waiver above his printed name (Record, 
-3-
Page 7 - Addendum Exhibit "C") and where no marks were apparent 
that would indicate someone had marked it or told him where to 
sign, as Appellant testified at trial (Record, Page 115 - Addendum 
Exhibit "D"). On January 10, 1973 the Decree of Divorce was 
entered in this matter, granting Respondent inter alia $100 per 
month per child for child support, and $200 per month as alimony 
(Record, Page 12), as had been prayed for in the Complaint filed 
in April 1972 (Record, Page 2-3) which was delivered to Appellant 
on December 3, 1972 (Record, Page 7). 
On May 17, 1973, Appellant brought an Order to Show Cause 
based on his allegation that he could not read, and that Respondent 
had misrepresented to him that no alimony would in the decree 
(Record, Page 14). The Order to Show Cause was noticed for July 
27, 1973 (Record, Page 17) and then stricken on the date of the 
hearing with Appellant's counsel present in Court (Record, Page 
18). In the meantime, Respondent brought her own Order to Show 
Cause to enforce the payments under the decree, which was signed 
June 20, 1973, but not filed until November 2, 1973 (Record, Page 
19-20). Appellant re-noticed his Order to Show Cause, and the 
matter came before the Court on November 28, 1973. 
On the day prior to the November 28, 1973 hearing, Appellant 
called the Respondent on the telephone and made threats against 
her life (Record, Pages 105-107). The Respondent appeared at the 
Courthouse the following day but refused to take part in the 
proceedings because of the death threats (Record, Page 106 and 
Wanda Bagshaw Testimony, Page 16 - Addendum Exhibit "E"). Although 
-4-
no evidentiary hearing was conducted, counsel for both parties, 
together with Appellant and his second wife, retired to conference 
room at the Courthouse to discuss the matter (Record, Page 108). 
What happened in the meeting at the Courthouse on November 
28, 1973 constitutes the basis of Appellant's position in this 
appeal, and is the crux of most issues now before this Court. 
According to the Appellant, he, his wife, and his attorney 
met with counsel for the Respondent (Record, Page 108 & 119); and 
an agreement was worked out where Respondent would agree to 
terminate alimony if the Appellant dropped his charges against 
Respondent for allegedly stealing his jeep and a federal income 
tax return (Record, Page 109 & 119). Appellant further alleges 
that Respondent agreed to the stipulation in a phone conversation 
that was placed to her by her attorney from the conference room 
(Record, Page 109 & 120). 
It is undisputed that Respondent was not at the Courthouse 
meeting on November 28, 1973. Respondent further alleges that 
she did not receive a call from her attorney while he was at the 
Courthouse (Exhibit "E"), and further, that she never authorized 
her attorney to enter into an agreement waiving her right to 
alimony (Wanda Bagshaw Testimony, Page 21 - Addendum Exhibit "B"). 
Neither attorney who participated in the Courthouse meeting 
on November 28, 1973 has any recollection of the meeting, or any 
stipulation between the parties (Record Pages 106-115). Further, 
the minute entry for November 28,1973 does not reflect any stipulation 
having been entered on the record, it does not reflect any testimony 
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from either party. When viewed together with the testimony of 
Appellant's wife (Record, Page 108), it appears that after suggesting 
that counsel meet and attempt to work out the differences between 
the parties, an entry was made that continued the Order to Show 
Cause hearing in anticipation of a stipulation and order that 
might be forthcoming (Record, Page 23). There is no testimony, 
nor does the minute entry of November 28, 1973 reflect, that 
counsel went before the Court after the meeting and announced a 
stipulation had been reached. 
From the date of the meeting until an Order to Show Cause 
was brought to collect alimony arrearages in February 1988, 
Appellant asserts that he thought the issue of alimony had been 
resolved, even though papers were never drawn, signed or delivered 
to him reflecting the stipulation as he understood it to be 
(Record, Page 120-121). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Court below was correct in determining that good cause 
did not exist for the Court to make a nunc pro tunc order modifying 
the divorce decree to eliminate alimony because an enforceable 
agreement to modify the decree had not been arrived at between 
the parties. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I; GOOD CAUSE DOES NOT EXIST THAT WOULD JUSTIFY A 
NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER MODIFYING THE DIVORCE DECREE TO ELIMINATE 
ALIMONY EITHER BASED UPON THE ALLEGED STIPULATION OF 
NOVEMBER 28, 1973; OR ANY OTHER EVENT SINCE THAT TIME. 
If this Court were to accept Appellants statement of facts 
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as undisputed, there would still be no basis for any Court to 
issue a nunc pro tunc order terminating alimony under the statutory 
provisions of § 30-4a-l of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) as 
amended or under the ruling of Home v. Home, 737 P. 2d 244 (Utah 
App. 1987) which has interpreted the statute. 
The nunc pro tunc statute is significant, primarily because 
it changes the old common law rule that a nunc pro tunc order 
could only be entered when errors could be corrected or omissions 
supplied where a complete and signed agreement had been reached, 
or a signed order completely made. [See Preece v. Preece, 682 
P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 1984)] The focus of the common law rule was 
to prevent nunc pro tunc orders where substantive issues remained 
to be resolved and were nut resolved, at the time a particular 
order was sought to be entered. At common law, the presence of a 
signed agreement or order was viewed as a evidence of finality 
where a Court would not be required to go back and attempt to 
determine the intent of the parties. 
When the Utah State Legislature passed the provisions of 
§ 30-4a-l in 1984, it substituted "good cause" as a standard that 
could overcome the common law rule that a signed agreement or 
order was required to make the record speak the truth. While the 
statute did, indeed, give broader discretion to Courts in the use 
of nunc pro tunc orders in matters related to marriage, it did 
not alter the focus of a nunc pro tunc order to enter now, what 
previously had been made. This Court in Home pointed out that 
"Statutes are not to be construed as effecting any change in the 
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common law beyond which is clearly indicated [Home at 248, 
emphasis added]. In this instance, the common law requirement of 
a signed order or stipulation was replaced with the standard of 
good cause, which would allow a Court to enter an order where an 
agreement or order had not been signed, but the where intent of the 
parties was obvious and a nunc pro tunc order was justified to 
avoid manifest injustice. No other aspect of the old common law 
rule was changed. 
Under both the common law rule and the statutory rule there 
is no room for a court to substitute its substantive opinion of the 
intent of parties where there is no factual basis to support such 
findings. The substance of an agreement must be undisputable. 
The focus of a court under the statutory rule, as under the common 
law rule, remains procedural; to correct obvious errors and 
omissions to avoid obvious injustice. In Home, this Court gave 
substantial deference to the legislative intent that preceded the 
statute, citing several examples made by Rep. Lorin Pace during 
the 3rd reading of House Bill 218 which ultimately became § 30-
4a-l. In each example cited by Rep. Pace, the instance of injustice 
focused on procedural errors and omissions [Home at 248]. 
In the facts at bar, the required good cause does not exist 
that would have justified the Court below in issuing a nunc pro 
tunc order as prayed by Defendant. There is no question that the 
Court would have been required to make substantive presumptions 
if it had attempted to enter a nunc pro tunc order as prayed for 
by Appellant. Not only was there no signed agreement as required 
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by the old rule, there.was not even a draft of a proposed agreement 
or order. All the court had to rely on, knowing that Respondent 
was not at the meeting the day the alleged agreement took place, 
was the self-serving testimony of Appellant, which on its face 
does not appear to be anything other than a subjective cry of 
foul from a man who has only had to pay child support and alimony 
when forced to by the State of Utah, 
Appellant states that he agreed to drop charges of theft of 
his jeep and a federal income tax return as consideration for the 
agreement to drop alimony. While the assertion may have some 
remote resemblance to reasonableness on its face, when viewed 
under the totality of circumstances, it is, in fact, illusory. 
The Title to the jeep was in Respondent's name whiirh allowed her 
to sell it; the income tax return was also made out in her name, 
along with her ex-husband. While nothing justifies her violation 
of the decree which awards the jeep to her husband, and nothing 
justified her signing his name to the check, the failure of 
Appellant to meet any of his obligations under the decree prior 
to the alleged agreement on November 28, 1973 had given rise to 
substantial claims in favor of Respondent that would have more 
than offset his claims against her had the issues been tried. 
What benefit was she receiving in turn for her agreement to drop 
alimony? If anything, she was forfeiting more than she could 
possibly have lost at trial, just for the privilege of giving up 
alimony and avoiding the threats made over the jeep and federal 
check. These facts as purported by Appellant, at close scrutiny, 
-9-
lack any logical basis to support his conclusions. 
In adopting a new standard of "good cause" as the statutory 
basis for nunc pro tunc, the legislature eliminated the old rule 
that prevented such an order where no signed order or agreement 
existed, even in the face of obvious injustice where no substantive 
dispute existed between parties and their intent was indisputable. 
When a nunc pro tunc order was prevented under the old 
common law rule, where good cause existed, the intent of parties 
was clear and the injustice was blatant, simply because an order 
or agreement was not signed through procedural error, the lament 
of great legal minds has been shrill. Indeed, this Court in 
Home cited to one of the more famous quotes of Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes paraphrased by Justice Crockett in his dissent to 
Daly v. Daly, 533 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah, 1975) as follows: 
There is nothing more revolting to one's sense of 
justice than to have it asserted that something must be 
done that way because it was so laid down in the reign 
of Henry IV; and it is even more so, if whatever reason 
for doing it that way has long since vanished. 
Obviously, under the old rule, the requirement of a signature 
to an order or agreement insured that a nunc pro tunc order did 
not involve substantive revisions or impositions by a court in 
making such an order. Though the old rule was effective in 
preventing a court from substituting its own judgment for that of 
the parties, it still prevented courts from making equitable 
changes where the intent of parties was absolutely clear but no 
signed order or agreement was present. By adopting the standard 
of "good cause", the legislature provided the needed statutory 
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relief that gave courts wider discretion to prevent "obvious 
injustices" [Home at 248, emphasis added]. In Home, after 
clearly enunciating the contrast between the common law rule and 
statutory requirements for nunc pro tunc orders, This Court 
reversed the trial Court's entry of a nunc pro tunc order because 
the nunc pro tunc order did not conform to the expressed language 
of the parties as had been read into the record, and eliminated 
any references to the tax consequences of property distribution 
under the divorce decree. This Court set aside the nunc pro tunc 
order, stating: 
. . . the court either misunderstood the how critical 
the tax language was to the parties1 agreement or 
substituted its own judgment for that of the parties, 
and it misused its nunc pro tunc powers to accomplish 
that aim. [Horne, at 249] 
Accordingly, though courts now have wider discretionary 
powers to enter nunc pro tunc orders, such discretion does not include 
substantive changes that require a court to substitute its judgment 
for that of the parties. The new standard of "good cause" still 
requires that its meaning be determined on a case by case basis, 
in light of all the surrounding circumstances, as equity and 
justice require [Id. at 248]. The intent of the parties must be 
clear, and the order must be used to correct obvious injustice. 
In the case at bar, Appellant cries injustice at having to 
pay 8 years of arrearages under the decree, which is all that the 
Respondent was legally able to pursue. In this instance, Appellant 
has confused injustice with inconvenience. 
Injustice is having a valid decree where a party has refused 
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to obey a lawful court order with impunity, knowing that his ex-
wife does not have the resources to chase him through court to 
enforce the order. Injustice is asserting detrimental reliance 
on purported agreement where nothing was given up in order to 
claim a substantial financial windfall. Injustice is playing 
dumb under the pretext of illiteracy when ample resources and 
time were, and are, available to insure that individuals are 
represented, and rights are protected. Injustice is relying on 
years of ignorant bliss as a basis for asserting a self-serving 
version of a purported agreement should replace a valid and 
enforceable decree, especially where a person has had ample time 
and resources to seek proper redress from an unjust decree, if in 
fact it is unjust. 
Clearly, the Court below was correct in its inability to 
find good cause that would justify a nunc pro tunc order in this 
matter. 
POINT NO. 2: THE COURT'S RULING IN LIGHT OF BROWN V. BROWN 
IS CORRECT, AND NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF 
§ 30-4A-1 OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) AS AMENDED. 
In the Minute Entry of August 4, 1988 (Record, Page 89) and 
the subsequent Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by 
the Trial Court (Record, Page 135), substantial emphasis is 
placed on the ruling in Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah App. 
1987) as the basis of its decision in favor of Respondent. 
Brown was handed down by this Court on October 21, 1987, 
approximately 5 months after its decision in Home. The rule of 
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law established in Brown is best stated in the Courtfs citation 
to 73 Am.Jur.2d Stipulations § 2 (1974) wherein it states: 
. . . unless it is clear from the record that the 
parties assented, there is no stipulation, and it is 
provided in many jurisdictions, by rule of court or by 
statute, that a private agreement or consent between 
the parties or their attorneys, in respect to the 
proceedings in a cause, will not be enforced by the 
court unless it is evidenced by a writing subscribed by 
a party against whom it is alleged or made, and filed 
by the clerk or entered upon the minutes of the court. 
Any other rule would require the court to pass upon the 
credibility of the attorneys. 
This Court goes on to cite the Utah Rules of Practice in District 
and Circuit Court and their conformity to the Statute of Frauds 
as further support for the stated requirements of a stipulation. 
At first blush, the ruling in Brown seems to contradict the 
ruling in Home, and the elimination of a required signature in 
Home may have become a red herring that the Appellant would have 
us chase into the rationale of Brown. A closer look, however, 
reveals that the two cases are consistent, if not complimentary. 
In Home, the discretionary powers of a court to enter a nunc pro 
tunc order to correct procedural errors and omissions are widened, 
while in Brown, the standards for assessing the substantive 
agreement between parties is clarified. 
Like the case at bar, Brown involves a dispute over -in 
alleged agreement that took place at a meeting between the parties 
and their counsel. Unlike this case, however, both parties in 
Brown were present, the alleged stipulation was recorded by a 
court reporter, and a written stipulation was sent to counsel for 
signature of the parties. This Court in Brown reversed the trial 
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court's order modifying the decree to conform to the agreement as 
it appeared on the court reporter's transcript and the proposed 
agreement because the putative stipulation was not evidenced by a 
writing subscribed by the parties or made orally in open court 
where a judge would have been involved and likely would have made 
inquiry of both parties. 
Could the trial court have modified the decree in Brown 
without such a signature under a Home nunc pro tunc order? 
The answer is obviously no, in light of all the circumstances. 
The key to understanding the procedural discretion of Home in 
light of the apparent procedural restrictions imposed in Brown 
lies in this Court's concern for substantive agreement. 
A nunc pro tunc order cannot make a past record speak the 
truth unless the modification is, indeed the truth. The concern 
of this Court in Brown, and Home as well, is to determine the 
actual intent of the parties, without the imposition of a trial 
court's judgment on substantive issues. In Brown, this Court 
addresses the issue of substantive agreement by focusing on the 
common law and statutory requirements of a stipulation. 
Basic to a valid stipulation is a meeting of the minds 
of those involved. The parties must have completed 
their negotiations in person or through their attorneys 
acting within the rules of agency. The agreement then 
is reduced to writing, signed and filed with the clerk 
or read into the record before the court. [Brown at 335] 
Though the ruling in Brown does not necessarily define or 
limit what constitutes "good cause" to modify an order nunc pro 
tunc, it does establish the standard by which all substantive 
agreements, in nunc pro tunc cases and otherwise, will be viewed 
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to determine the intent of the parties. 
In essence, the primary issue before this Court in the case 
at bar is whether or not the parties entered into an enforceable 
stipulation that would justify a nunc pro tunc ordei fn modify 
the decree. Basic to that issue is whether or not there was a 
meeting of the minds between the parties. The record clearly 
indicates there was not. 
In spite of Appellant's assertions about what constitutes good 
cause and how his rights have been impaired by the strict imposition 
of procedural requirements in Brown, all of which seem to trail 
through Appellant's brief like a knight in search of the Holy 
Grail, the one issue that Appellant has not, and cannot overcome, 
is the fact that there was no meeting of the minds on November 
28, 1973, nor has there been since that time. 
In spite of Plaintiff/Appellantfs representation to the 
contrary, (Testimony of Wanda Bagshaw, Page 21 - Addendum Exhibit 
"F"), Appellant would have the Court believe that there really 
was r\ meeting of the minds based upon his version of the November 
28, 1973 meeting, and upon a minute entry (Record, Page 23) that 
purports to verify such a meeting of the minds because "the 
alimony was the primary contention of the parties" (Appellant's 
Brief, Page 14). Since the minute entry makes reference to a 
pending stipulation, and since Appellant would never had agreed 
to continue alimony, the reference to a "pending stipulation" 
must mean that Respondent agreed to the demands of her ex-husband, 
even though she testified she never agreed, nor authorized her 
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attorney to agree. Obviously such reasoning is wholly without 
merit, and is as far from "good cause" as it can get. 
Whether or not Rule 4.5(b) of the Utah Rules of Practice 
were in effect in 1973, the Statute of Frauds provisions found at 
§ 25-5-4 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended, had been 
in effect in substantially the same form for almost a century. 
Here, the Appellant would have us modify a decree based upon his 
representations of an oral agreement that purportedly took place 
15 years ago! [emphasis added] This is exactly the type of 
situation that the Statute of Frauds has intended to avoid since 
its earliest inception in our common law heritage. 
In short, the principles set forth in Brown have been applied 
correctly to the case at bar. There was no meeting of the minds 
between the parties on November 28, 1973; nor has there been 
since. There is no testimony in the record that can reasonably 
infer that a meeting of the minds took place. There is no writing 
or record before the Court that specifies the substantive agreement, 
if any, that was purportedly reached on November 28, 1973. The 
Court below had no choice but to rule that an enforceable stipulation 
had not, and has not taken place so as to justify a nunc pro tunc 
order modifying a valid decree in this matter. 
POINT NO. 3: RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S 
FEES INCURRED IN THIS APPEAL. 
There is ample evidence in this matter that Respondent has 
been, and continues to be, financially unable to bear the cost of 
enforcing her rights under the decree. At the outset of the 
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divorce, Respondent was required to sign an affidavit of impecuniosi 
to have the complaint served (Record, Page 5); she testified at 
the hearing in this matter in July 1988, that she sold the jeep 
and took the check in 1973 because of Appellant's refusal to give 
her any money under the decree (Testimony of Wanda Bagshaw, Page 
21-23); she testified that she was on welfare until 1981, and had 
to return to welfare briefly in 1984 (Id. at 17); and th-if -.IIH 
has made approximately $4.00 per hour since going off assistance 
in 1985 (Id. at Page 25). 
Throughout the period of time since the decree was entered 
in 1973, Respondent has never received child support payments or 
alimony payments from Appellant (Id. Page 18); and even though 
she has received a judgment in the amount of $19,400 from the 
Court below, it still represents substantially less than what she 
would have received had Appellant paid alimony as required by the 
decree. In short, Appellant has ignored the Court order in this 
matter for over 15 years, knowing that Respondents financial 
position, compounded by his refusal to provide any support to her 
at all, severely limited her ability to pursue Appellant through 
Court to enforce the decree. 
Counsel for Respondent has testified, without objection from 
counsel for Appellant, that his fees are reasonable and within 
the prevailing rate in Salt Lake City (Id. at Pages 39-40) and 
pursuant to the affidavit of counsel (Addendum Exhibit "P") 
Respondent has at the time of filing this brief, incurred costs 
and fees of approximately $4,200 based on over 40 hours of research, 
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drafting and preparation for this appeal which was necessary to 
preserve Respondent's judgment. This Court is justified in 
awarding attorney's fees and costs because the need for such 
award has been supported by the evidence in this matter, the 
hourly billing rate is clearly within the prevailing rate in Salt 
Lake City, and Respondent's need is more than reasonable in light 
of all the facts in this case [Newmeyer v. Newmeyer/ 745 P.2d 1276 
(Utah 1987); see also Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 
1986); and Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984)]. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court below in this appeal was correct in awarding 
Respondent a judgment in the amount of $19,400 for alimony due 
under the decree that was entered herein on January 10, 1973. 
Appellant has not, and cannot, show good cause for a nunc pro 
tunc order modifying the decree as of November 28, 1973, because 
there was never a meeting of the minds with regard to such meeting. 
The omissions and errors following the November 28, 1973, if any 
do exist, would go far beyond simple procedural error, and would 
require substantive interference by a court in order to accomplish 
what Appellant seeks in this appeal. Further, there is no written 
record, no oral record made before the court, and no signed 
stipulation that would make such an alleged agreement enforceable 
in light of the Statute of Frauds and the rule set down in Brown. 
Finally, the record clearly shows all of the elements necessary 
to find that Respondent is entitled to, and should be awarded, 
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costs and attorney's fees incurred in this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of , 1989. 
JOI^ SPENCER SNOW 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
Certificate of Delivery 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered 4 true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to Randall 
Gaither, Esq., Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, at 321 South 600 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, this. 
, 1989. 
_day of 
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ADDENDUM 
The text of § 25-5-4 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended, 
is as follows: 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed. 
In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such 
agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing 
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed 
within one year from the making thereof. 
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage 
of another. 
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon 
consideration of marriage, except mutual promises to marry. 
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or administrator 
to answer in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of 
the testator or intestate out of his own estate. 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or 
broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation. 
The text of § 30-4a-l of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended, 
is as follows: 
30-4a-l. Authority of court. A court having jurisdiction may, 
upon its finding of good cause and giving of such notice as may 
be ordered, enter an order nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to 
marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment of marriage. 
-20-
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decree of divorce by the Court? 
f£) No. 
cy Okay. Now, with regard to Mr. Bagshaw, what is 
your own personal knowledge about his ability to read 
and write? 
Well, he's always signed papers when we've bought 
things. He used to have a subscription to the Outdoor Life 
that he read. He used to read all the proclamations and 
he used to write to me when he was in the service. 
Q In regard to your divorce decree, it also provides he 
is to pay medical and dental expenses, that is, if there 
are any. Did he pay anything at all that was not covered 
by insurance? 
A No. 
(Qy Have you ever verbally agreed either with your 
attorney, Mr. Bagshaw, or anyone, to waive that alimony 
provision? 
(A) NO. 
/Qy Did you ever authorize Mr. Haycock to enter into 
negotiations to terminate alimony for you? 
/(h/ No. 
A?) In regard to your subsequent - - t o your divorce 
decree and after it was entered by the Court, did you make 
any appearances in court on the decree, other than the one 
time you mentioned in November of 1973? 
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SPENCER L. HAYCOCK 
A t t o r n e y fo r p l a i n t i f f 
731 E a s t South Temple 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84102 
Te lephone : 322-3551 
JAN 10 1973 
'^-m-v rsrf -
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
..r C -
/ * / 
WANDA MARIE SACKETT BAGSHAW, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW, 
Defendant. 
APPEARANCE AND WAIVER 
Civil No. (/> /J7f 
COMES NOW Joseph Arthur Bagshaw, Defendant in the above 
entitled case, and acknowledges the receipt of a copy of the 
Plaintiff's Complaint on file herein, and waives time in which to 
plead or otherwise answer said Complaint and agrees that the 
Plaintiff may apply to the Court for a default at any time without 
further notice. 
DATED this "i 5 ,tday of November, 1972. 
/Zf-' 
JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW/" Defendant 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
On this jrVb. ^aY of November', 1972, personally appeared 
before me JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW, the signer of the foregoing instru-
ment, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
ling 
My Commission Expires: 
•ciiJi* LieJeG Con *fey, Utah 
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THE COURT: Mr. Bagshaw, I?m going tc ask you, please, 
to scoot up close to the mike. Speak right into it so we can 
hear you. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. I was in St. George at the time 
and we talked on the phone and at that time she had said 
all she wanted was a quick divorce and child support and that 
was it and the furniture in our trailer house that we had 
down in St. George, and I says, "Yes, you can have it all," 
and I says, "You111 have to mark on it or tell me where to 
sign," and so she did and that's what'I did. I signed where 
she told me to sign on the paper. 
Q And after the signing, did you deliver that paper to 
her? 
A No, it was sent back to her, but with a mailing, you 
know, an envelope that she had filled out and I just sent it 
to her, you know, by putting stamps on it. 
Q What was your understanding at the time concerning 
the Divorce decree and alimony, if any? 
A There was nothing said about alimony in any way or 
form. 
Q Did there come to your attention sometime in the 
future information that maybe the divorce decree provided 
for alimony? 
A Yes. My brother had read it to me. It was after the 
divorce. He had said, "Hey, do you know that you are paying 
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Yes. 
And when did you go to court? 
On November 28th of '73. 
You were present in court on that day? 
I met with the lawyers in the hall and then I was 
dismissed. 
Q 
A 
o 
Did you receive a later phone call that day? 
Yes. 
And Mr. Havcock called vou ur> from the court? 
f A } Well, I don't know if he was at court. I think he 
was home because I called him. 
Q I'm going to show you what's been marked as 
Defendant's Exhibit Number 1 and ask if you can identify 
the signature on this document, which we'll call for 
purposes of the record the assignment of collection of 
support payments. 
A That's my signature. 
Q Did you sign it about the time it's dated, January 
the 10th, 1972? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Did you leave the original of this document with the 
Office of Recovery Services? 
A Yes. 
MR. GAITHER: At this time I would offer Defendant's 
Exhibit Number 1. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WANDA MARIE SACKETT BAGSHAW, 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 880647-CA 
vs. : 
Priority Classification 
JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW : No. 14b 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
JOHN SPENCER SNOW, first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. That he is counsel for Respondent in the above-captioned 
matter; 
2. That the matters testified to herein are based upon his 
own personal knowledge; 
3. That it was necessary to expend approximately 42 hours 
to research issues, draft arguments and prepare the Respondents 
Brief in this appeal as of the time of filing Respondents brief; 
4. That since the trial in this matter, the affiant has 
raised his legal fees to $100 per hour, which rates are commensurate 
with rates normally found for such legal services in Salt Lake 
City, Utah; 
5. That Respondent has incurred approximately $4,200 in 
fees in responding to this Appeal; 
6. That in the legal opinion of the Affiant, Respondent's 
incurring of such fees was necessary to preserve her judgment 
7. That the Respondent is not capable of paying all of her 
fees without incurring substantial financial hardship on herself; 
8. That Respondent is in need of an order from this Court 
awarding costs and attorney's fees incurred as of the date of the 
decision in this appeal. 
9. Further, the affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this 3*4 day of JtY\*r*4 , 1989 
JOHN^SPENCE^SNOW 
Attorney for Respondent 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this J^ day of 
n)drcl , 1989. 
)TARYPUBLIC>o * <b NO RY F tSLl yO 
Residing atr/C^^/t^-
My Commission Expires 
Seal 
